

In May, 1914, it was explained that the embargo did not apply to American shipments through Mexican ports, and ammunition for Carranza was subsequently landed at Tampico. In September, 1914, the embargo was lifted on exports across the border; thereupon military supplies reached both Villa and Carranza. In October, 1915, an embargo was declared on all exports of arms except to the adherents of Carranza. There was an utter absence of consistent policy.

CARRANZA'S RECOGNITION

For a time we bestowed friendship on Villa. Ultimately we recognized Carranza, not on the ground that he had a constitutional government, but that it was a de facto government. The complete failure to secure protection to American citizens is shown conclusively in the note of the secretary of state of June 20, 1916, in which he thus described the conditions that have obtained during the last three years:

"For three years the Mexican republic has been torn with civil strife; the lives of Americans and other aliens have been sacrificed; vast properties developed by American capital and enterprise have been destroyed or rendered non-productive; bandits have been permitted to roam at will through the territory contiguous to the United States and to seize, without punishment or without effective attempt at punishment, the property of Americans, while the lives of citizens of the United States who ventured to remain in Mexican territory or to return there to protect their interests have been taken, in some cases barbarously taken, and the murderers have neither been apprehended nor brought to justice. * * * It would be tedious to recount instance after instance, outrage after outrage, atrocity after atrocity, to illustrate the true nature of the widespread conditions of lawlessness and violence which have prevailed."

The Santa Ysabel massacre, the raid at Columbus, the bloodshed at Carrizal, are fresh in your minds. After the Columbus raid we started a "punitive expedition." We sent a thin line of troops hundreds of miles into Mexico, between two lines of railway, neither of which we were allowed to use and which we did not feel at liberty to seize. We were refused permission to enter the towns. Though thus restricted, the enterprise was still regarded by the Mexicans as a menace. Our troops faced hostile forces, and it is not remarkable that our men fell at Carrizal. What other result could be expected?

THE PURPOSE UNACCOMPLISHED

We were virtually ordered to withdraw, and without accomplishing our purpose we have been withdrawing and we are now endeavoring to safeguard our own territory. The entire national guard has been ordered out, and many thousands of our citizens have been taken from their peaceful employment and hurried to the Mexican border. The administration was to seize and punish Villa for his outrage on our soil. It has not punished anyone; we went in only to retire; future movements are apparently to be determined by a joint commission.

The nation has no policy of aggression toward Mexico. We have no desire for any part of her territory. We wish her to have peace, stability, and prosperity. We should be ready to aid her in binding up her wounds, in relieving her from starvation and distress, and in giving her in every practicable way the benefits of our disinterested friendship. The conduct of this administration has created difficulties which we shall have to surmount. We shall have to overcome the antipathy needlessly created by that conduct and to develop genuine respect and confidence. We shall have to adopt a new policy, a policy of firmness and consistency, through which alone we can promote an enduring friendship.

DEMANDS PROTECTION OF CITIZENS

We demand from Mexico the protection of the lives and property of our citizens and the security of our border from depredations. Much will be gained if Mexico is convinced that we contemplate no meddlesome interference with what does not concern us, but we propose to insist in a firm and candid manner upon the performance of international obligations. To a stable government, appropriately discharging its international duties, we shall give ungrudging support. A short period of firm, consistent, and friendly dealing will accomplish more than many years of vacillation.

In this land of composite population, drawing its strength from every race, the national security demands that there shall be no paltering with American rights. The greater the danger of divisive influences, the greater is the necessity

for the unifying force of a just, strong, and patriotic position. We countenance no covert policies, no intrigues, no secret schemes. We are unreservedly, devotedly, wholeheartedly, for the United States. That is the rallying point for all Americans. That is my position. I stand for the unflinching maintenance of all American rights on land and sea.

We have had a clear and definite mission as a great neutral nation. It was for us to maintain the integrity of international law; to vindicate our rights as neutrals; to protect the lives of our citizens, their property, and trade from wrongful acts. Putting aside any question as to the highest possibilities of moral leadership in the maintenance and vindication of the law of nations in connection with the European war, at least we were entitled to the safeguarding of American rights. But this has not been secured.

SERIES OF DIPLOMATIC NOTES

We have had brave words in a series of notes, but, despite our protests, the lives of Americans have been destroyed. What does it avail to use some of the strongest words known to diplomacy if ambassadors can receive the impression that the words are not to be taken seriously? It is not words, but the strength and resolution behind the words that count.

The chief function of diplomacy is prevention, but in this our diplomacy failed, doubtless because of its impaired credit and the manifest lack of disposition to back words with action. Had this government, by the use of both informal and formal diplomatic opportunities, left no doubt that when we said "strict accountability" we meant precisely what we said, and that we should unhesitatingly vindicate that position, I am confident that there would have been no destruction of American lives by the sinking of the Lusitania. There we had ample notice; in fact, published notice. Furthermore, we knew the situation, and we did not require specific notice. Instead of whittling away our formal statements by equivocal conversations, we needed the straight, direct, and decisive representations which every diplomat and foreign office would understand. I believe that in this way we should have been spared the repeated assaults on American lives. Moreover, a firm American policy would have been strongly supported by our people, and the opportunities for the development of bitter feeling would have been vastly reduced.

It is a great mistake to say that resoluteness in protecting American rights would have led to war. Rather, in that course lay the best assurance of peace. Weakness and indecision in the maintenance of known rights are always sources of grave danger; they forfeit respect and invite serious wrongs, which in turn create an uncontrollable popular resentment. That is not the path of national security.

THE MAINTENANCE OF RIGHTS

Not only have we a host of resources short of war by which to enforce our just demands, but we shall never promote our peace by being stronger in words than in deeds. We should not have found it difficult to maintain peace, but we should have maintained peace with honor. During this critical period the only danger of war has lain in the weak course of the administration.

I do not put life and property on the same footing, but the administration has not only been remiss with respect to the protection of American lives; it has been remiss with respect to the protection of American property and American commerce. It has been too much disposed to be content with leisurely discussion. I can not now undertake to review the course of events, but it is entirely clear that we failed to use the resources at our command to prevent injurious action, and that we suffered in consequence. We have no ulterior purposes, and the administration should have known how to secure the entire protection of every legitimate American interest and the prompt recognition of our just demands as a neutral nation.

We denounce all plots and conspiracies in the interest of any foreign nation. Utterly intolerable is the use of our soil for alien intrigues. Every American must unreservedly condemn them and support every effort for their suppression. But here, also, prompt, vigorous, and adequate measures on the part of the administration were needed. There should have been no hesitation, no notion that it was wise and politic to delay. Such an abuse of our territory demanded immediate and thoroughgoing action. As soon as the administration had notice of plots and conspiracies it was its duty to stop them. It was not lacking in resources. Its responsibility

for their continuance can not be escaped by the condemnation of others.

We are a peace-loving people, but we live in a world of arms. We have no thought of aggression, and we desire to pursue our democratic ideals without the wastes of strife. So devoted are we to these ideals, so intent upon our normal development, that I do not believe that there is the slightest danger of militarism in this country. Adequate preparedness is not militarism. It is the essential assurance of security; it is a necessary safeguard of peace.

SHOCKINGLY UNPREPARED

It is apparent that we are shockingly unprepared. There is no room for controversy on this point since the object lesson on the Mexican border. All our available regular troops—less, I believe, than 40,000—are there or in Mexico, and as these have been deemed insufficient the entire national guard has been ordered out; that is, we are summoning practically all our movable military forces in order to prevent bandit excursions. In view of the warnings of the last three years, it is inexcusable that we should find ourselves in this plight. For our faithful guardsmen, who with a fine patriotism responded to this call and are bearing this burden, I have nothing but praise. But I think it little short of absurd that we should be compelled to call men from their shops, their factories, their offices, and their professions for such a purpose.

This, however, is not all. The units of the national guard were at peace strength, which was only about one-half the required strength. It was necessary to bring in recruits, for the most part raw and untrained. Only a small percentage of the regiments recruited up to war strength will have had even a year's training in the national guard, which at the maximum means 100 hours of military drill, and, on the average, means much less.

Take the eastern department as an illustration. The states in this department contain 72 per cent of the entire organized militia of the country. I am informed by competent authority that the quota of militia from the department, recently summoned with the units raised to war strength as required would amount to about 131,000 men; that in response to this call there are now en route to or on the border about 54,000 men, and in camp in their respective states about 28,000 men; and thus, after what has already been accomplished, there still remain to be supplied in recruits about 48,000 men.

UNTRAINED MEN CALLED OUT

Men fresh from their peaceful employments and physically unprepared have been hurried to the border for actual service. They were without proper equipment; without necessary supplies; suitable conditions of transportation were not provided. Men with dependent families were sent, and conditions which should have been well known were discovered after the event. And yet the exigency, comparatively speaking, was not a very grave one. It involved nothing that could not readily have been foreseen during the last three years of disturbance and required only a modest talent for organization. That this administration while pursuing its course in Mexico should have permitted such conditions to exist is almost incredible.

In the demand for reasonable preparedness the administration has followed, not led. Those who demanded more adequate forces were first described as "nervous and excited." Only about a year and a half ago we were told that the question of preparedness was not a pressing one; that the country had been misinformed. Later, under the pressure of other leadership, this attitude was changed. The administration, it was said had "learned something," and it made a belated demand for an increased army. Even then the demand was not prosecuted consistently and the pressure exerted on congress with respect to other administrative measures was notably absent. The President addressed congress but little over six months ago, presenting the plans of the war department, and congress was formally urged to sanction these plans as "the essential first steps."

They contemplated an increase of the standing force of the regular army from its then strength of 5,023 officers and 102,985 enlisted men to a strength of 7,136 officers and 134,707 enlisted men, or 141,843 all told. It was said that these additions were "necessary to render the army adequate for its present duties." Further, it was proposed that the army should be supplemented by a force of 400,000 disciplined citizens raised in increments of 133,000 a year through a period of three years." At least so

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